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ABSTRACT 
 
This study tests for underreaction and overreaction in the South African stock market by 
examining abnormal returns on the stocks included in the FTSE Group Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange Top 40 index following large price rises and drops. The results of our empirical 
investigation suggest that large price increases and declines are likely to be followed by positive 
market returns. In addition, for the post-2008 time period the risk of these stocks increases 
significantly for up to two years following the original event. Therefore, the results lend further 
support to the Uncertain Information Hypothesis. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
he Efficient Market Hypothesis is an integral part of modern financial economics and one of the 
pillars of neoclassical finance theory. De Bondt and Thaler (1985) challenged this pillar when they, 
motivated by findings in the field of experimental psychology, detected predictable return reversals in 
stock prices. They attributed these patterns to overreaction to new information by investors. The ability to use past 
data to predict future returns is a violation of the Efficient Market Hypothesis. Not surprisingly, the detection of 
overreaction prompted a large body of further research, which focused on the predictability of stock returns. While 
there is considerable evidence in favor of stock return predictability, the underlying reasons remain largely unclear. 
One possible explanation for this pattern is suggested by Zarowin (1990) and Atkins and Dyl (1990). Their results 
indicate that overreaction is a manifestation of the size-effect. However, other researchers argue that it is caused by 
the bid-ask-spread and infrequent trading (Conrad & Kaul, 1993). In addition, some studies report momentum after 
large stock price drops (Ising, Schiereck, Simpson, & Thomas, 2006), which they attribute to investor underreaction. 
Brown, Harlow, and Tinic (1988) develop a competing hypothesis to the Overreaction Hypothesis, which reconciles 
the empirical findings with the Efficient Market Hypothesis. Their Uncertain Information Hypothesis assumes that 
rational, risk-averse investors overreact to bad news and underreact to good news, since the actual impact of the new 
information is not immediately clear. 
 
More recent research on markets outside the US find supportive evidence for the Efficient Market 
Hypothesis (e.g., Lobe & Rieks, 2011; Himmelmann, Schiereck, Simpson, & Zschoche, 2012). Consequently, the 
question arises whether international stock markets are efficient in general or if efficiency only holds for more 
mature markets. As the development of financial markets is often closely related to the overall development of a 
country one would expect to find more market inefficiencies in not yet fully developed countries rather than in 
developed ones. The question of market efficiency is particularly interesting with regard to emerging markets, such 
as the BRICS-countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) as they become major players in the global 
economy and increasingly draw the interest of international investors. 
 
This study contributes to the current literature on market efficiency by examining the market reaction to 
large price movements in the South African stock market. In contrast to prior research, the present study does not 
T 
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focus on a well-established developed market, but rather on one of the most prominent emerging markets and aims 
at establishing whether emerging stock markets display the same efficiency as developed ones. South Africa, often 
considered the gateway to Africa, is a particularly interesting market to investigate as it holds a unique position 
among African nations as the by far most developed economy on the continent. According to the World Banks’ 
World Development Indicators, South Africa accounted for 71.87% (US$ 311.778 billion) of the African stock 
market capitalization and 90.53% (US$ 612.308 billion) of the value of shares traded in 2012. It is also the most 
liquid African market, even though it still lags considerably behind the most liquid markets in the world. 
 
The rest of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly summarizes the existing empirical literature 
on the efficiency of stock markets with a special focus on South Africa. Section 3 describes the data sample and the 
methodology. Section 4 presents the main empirical results. The final section concludes the paper. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
A considerable body of literature already exists on the predictability of stock prices after large price 
increases and declines (for a comprehensive review see Amini, Gebka, Hudson, and Keasey (2013)). In order to 
exploit price reversals contrarian strategies are applied, which entail buying securities of previously losing firms and 
selling those of previous winners. Price continuation, on the other hand, can be exploited by applying a momentum 
strategy. In this case the investor buys securities of previous winners and sells those of losers. In the relevant 
literature, winners and losers are predominately identified either by their performance over a particular time period 
or by exceeding a certain predetermined threshold (e.g., 10% price change in one day). 
 
A considerable amount of the relevant literature follows De Bondt and Thaler (1985) in constructing 
portfolios of stocks that displayed either a comparatively weak or strong performance over a certain time period; the 
loser and winner portfolios, respectively. Based on the results of their empirical analysis, De Bondt and Thaler 
(1985) derive the Overreaction Hypothesis. Investors seem to emphasize recent information more strongly compared 
to prior data. This leads to an overreaction and subsequent price adjustments, which can be exploited. This in turn is 
a violation of the weak-form market efficiency, because future returns are predictable from past data. Lehmann 
(1990) confirms these results on a very short investment horizon, as his findings also suggest price reversals and 
hence overreaction. 
 
The results of Atkins and Dyl (1990) also point towards an overreaction by investors. However, in contrast 
to prior studies, they also compare the magnitude of the price reversals to the bid-ask spreads. According to their 
findings, arbitrageurs would not be able to profit from these price reversals, since the abnormal returns are small 
when compared to the bid-ask spreads. Therefore, Atkins and Dyl (1990) conclude that although there is an 
overreaction, it does not contradict market efficiency once transaction costs are accounted for. Employing a 
contrarian strategy, Chan (1988) only observes small abnormal returns and concludes that the results of De Bondt 
and Thaler (1985) are most likely due to a size effect, caused by the Sharpe (1964)-Lintner (1965) Capital Asset 
Pricing Model (CAPM). Zarowin (1990) complements the findings of Chan (1988). His results indicate significant 
size effects. Loser portfolio firms are on average smaller and even smaller winners outperform larger losers. Chopra, 
Lakonishok, and Ritter (1992) also find significant overreaction effects. Their results in particular indicate that the 
overreaction effect is more distinct for small companies. This can potentially be explained on the grounds that a 
relatively large percentage of the shares of small firms are frequently held by individual investors, while the shares 
of large firms are often predominantly held by institutional investors. 
 
Overreaction of winner and loser portfolios has also been documented for various international stock 
markets, such as Japan (Iihara, Kato, & Tokunaga, 2004), Brazil (da Costa, 1994), and the UK (Dissanaike, 1997). 
However, Dissanaike (1997) also finds short- and medium-turn momentum patterns in the UK market, a result later 
confirmed by Hon and Tonks (2003). The results of Gaunt (2000) also indicate price reversals on the Australian 
stock market, but this finding disappears once a buy and hold strategy is used. 
 
In contrast to the Overreaction Hypothesis, the Uncertain Information Hypothesis by Brown et al. (1988) 
reconciles the observed anomalies with the Efficient Market Hypothesis. The underlying assumption of the 
Uncertain Information Hypothesis is that new information introduces uncertainty, so that the impact of the new 
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information is not immediately apparent. Rational, risk-averse investors account for this uncertainty through 
additional risk-premiums and will overreact to bad news and underreact to good news. The empirical results of 
Brown et al. (1988) prove that this pattern exists in the US Market. Later studies corroborate these initial results for 
the US and other international markets (Ajayi & Mehdian, 1994; Schnusenberg & Madura, 2001; Yu, Rentzler, & 
Tandon, 2010). 
 
Besides constructing winner and loser portfolios based on past stock performance, another line of research 
identifies events based on securities exceeding a certain threshold with regards to their price change within a day, a 
week, or a month. Bremer and Sweeney (1991) report a significant rebound of stock prices during the two days 
following a price drop in excess of -10% on a given trading day. They conclude that this is largely inconsistent with 
the Efficient Market Hypothesis, as markets are supposed to correctly reflect news in the price of a security almost 
instantaneously. Benou and Richie (2003) examine monthly returns of the S&P 100 constituents and use a month-
on-month price change of at least -20% for a given security to determine an event month. They find significant 
positive abnormal returns following the initial price declines, lending further support to the Overreaction 
Hypothesis. Choi and Jayaraman (2009) also find overreaction patterns up to two days after a large price decline, 
albeit only for nonoptional stocks. However, this pattern can largely be explained by an abnormal rise in the bid-ask 
spread prior to the price decline event. 
 
Bremer, Hiraki, and Sweeney (1997) examine daily returns of stocks included in the NIKKEI 300 index. 
They find price reversals after large one day stock price drops, but remain doubtful of the possibility of being able to 
exploit this anomaly. Bowman and Iverson (1998) examine the behavior of stock prices in New Zealand after large 
weekly price changes. Their results suggest an asymmetric overreaction effect that persists even after testing for 
seasonality, size, and bid-ask spread effects. Ising et al. (2006) examine the performance of the largest 100 German 
firms. Their study shows that large price increases are followed by reversal patterns, but large price declines are 
followed by further declines, which they interpret as a sign of overoptimism by investors. Mazouz, Alrabadi, & Yin 
(2012) find evidence for continuation patterns after large price drops and increases. However, only stocks with high 
liquidity risk underreact, while stocks with low systematic risk show efficient reactions. Hence the authors reason 
that trading on the observed anomalies may not be profitable, as substantial liquidity risks are taken. Maher and 
Parikh (2011) also observe underreaction to large price drops by medium and small capitalization indices in India. In 
contrast, large price increases are not followed by a discernable pattern. The recent findings of Himmelmann et al. 
(2012) for Europe lend further support the Efficient Market Hypothesis, since neither reversal nor momentum 
patterns can be detected. 
 
Only few studies exist that investigate the South African stock market or African stock markets in general. 
In an early study Okeahalam and Jeffries (1999) investigate how quickly earning announcements are incorporated 
into the stock price of companies on the Johannesburg stock exchange. Using weekly data, their results suggests that 
the market displays semi-strong efficiency. Appiah-Kusi and Menyah (2003) use weekly index returns and show 
that the South African stock market is not weak-form market efficient. However, Jefferis and Smith (2005) find that 
the returns on the Johannesburg stock exchange follow a random walk and therefore to be weak-form efficient. The 
results of Smith (2008) further corroborate this finding. However, overall the evidence on the efficiency of the South 
African stock market remains contradictory. 
 
3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 Data Sample and Selection 
 
The present study examines the largest South African stocks, as listed in the FTSE/JSE Top 40 index from 
January 2003 to December 2011. This index consists of the 40 largest South African companies, ranked by full 
market value and listed on the Johannesburg stock exchange. Utilizing only the largest firms mitigates any biases 
that might arise due to size differentials. During the investigation period 68 different companies have been 
constituents of the FTSE/JSE Top 40, with an average listing time of 5.25 years. The index was originally launched 
in 2002 and is subject to quarterly revisions. Events are determined based on price data, while subsequent 
calculations are carried out with total return data. Data is provided by Thomson Reuters Financial Datastream. 
Following, among others, Benou and Richie (2003), Ising et al. (2006), and Himmelmann et al. (2012), a month is 
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identified as an event month for a particular firm, if there is an absolute price change of more than 20% in that 
month, using closing prices of the last trading day of the previous and actual month, respectively. Additionally, the 
investigated firm had to be a constituent of the index at the time of the event. 
 
Table 1: Distribution of Events Across Time 
 Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Total 
Panel A: Distribution of Price Increases over Time 
2003     9   2  2 1 1 15 
2004       1 3 1  3  8 
2005 1 2   4  1  5  1  14 
2006 2     2  1  2 1  8 
2007 1    1    1 2   5 
2008  6   1  3 2 1 1 3  17 
2009 1  8  7  3 3  1  1 24 
2010         1    1 
2011   1       1   2 
Total 5 8 9 0 22 2 8 11 9 9 9 2 94 
Panel B: Distribution of Price Decreases over Time 
2003  2 1 1         4 
2004    2         2 
2005    3         3 
2006  1           1 
2007        1   1  2 
2008 2     1 5  9 12 7  36 
2009 1 4  2         7 
2010   1          1 
2011             0 
Total 3 7 2 8 0 1 5 1 9 12 8 0 56 
 
Using this methodology, 150 events are identified between 2003 and 2011; 94 price increases and 56 price 
declines. Only 43 out of the 68 firms exhibit an event, resulting in an average of 3.49 events per firm. 
 
Table 1 shows that almost all events occur prior to 2010. Furthermore, 56% of all events occur in 2008 and 
2009. In addition, Panel B of Table 1 shows that 50% of all price declines are clustered between September and 
November 2008. This period can be viewed as the onset of the recent financial crisis on the South African Stock 
market. Besides these two anomalies, the event distribution does not provide any further insights. 
 
3.2 Methodology 
 
Event study results depend to a certain degree on the chosen asset pricing model. Fama (1998) points out 
that this effect multiplies when cumulating abnormal returns (ARs) to cumulative abnormal returns (CARs). 
Nevertheless, CARs seem to be more robust than long-term buy and hold abnormal returns, making them preferable. 
 
To define ARs, both the market-adjusted-model and the market-model are used. The usage of the market-
model is motivated by the work of Brocket, Chen, and Garven (1999). Their results suggest that the classical event 
study approach appears to be detecting more events than actually exist. In order to avoid this, Brocket et al. (1999) 
propose a model that incorporates autoregressive conditional heteroskedastic effects (ARCH). This is also supported 
by the findings of Schwert and Seguin (1990), who show that stock returns often exhibit a considerable degree of 
heteroskedasticity. They also suggest that taking time-varying volatility into account, evidence for abnormal returns 
ought to be weakened. Consequently, the error term in this model is not considered to be white noise. Instead, it is 
assumed to follow a generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedastic process (GARCH) with a lag of one in 
the conditional variance and the squared error, respectively (GARCH(1,1)). 
 
The market-adjusted-model is specified as: 
 
           , (1) 
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where Rjt denotes the return of stock j at time t, Rmt is the return of the market portfolio at time t and ejt is the error 
term. Monthly ARs are calculated according to: 
 
             (2) 
 
As suggested by Brocket et al. (1999), and later used by Benou and Richie (2003) and more recently 
Himmelmann et al. (2012), the GARCH (1,1) market-model is specified as: 
 
                , (3) 
 
where αj is the intercept for stock j, Rmt is the return of the market portfolio at time t, and βj the sensitivity of stock j 
to the market portfolio. The error term     is conditioned on the prior information set Ωt-1: 
 
    Ω           , (4) 
 
where N(0,ht) denotes the conditional distribution of the error term, given all available information at time t-1. The 
conditional distribution has a mean of zero and a variance of ht. The conditional variance ht in this GARCH(1,1) 
process is specified as: 
 
                     
  (5) 
 
The parameters in (3) and (5) are estimated using the maximum likelihood method with daily returns 
during the 1 year period prior to the event month. Using the market-model, the monthly ARs are calculated as: 
 
                       (6) 
 
where     and     are the regression estimates obtained from equation (3). The following calculations are the same for 
both models. For a sample of N events, monthly average ARs (AARs) are calculated as: 
 
      
 
 
     
 
   
 (7) 
 
where t denotes the month relative to the event month and t = 0 denotes the event month itself. The CAR during the 
time window [τ1,τ2] is then calculated as: 
 
                   
  
    
 (8) 
 
where τ1 and τ2 denote the months relative to the event month. Finally, for a sample of N events, average CARs 
(ACARs) are calculated as: 
 
             
 
 
             
 
   
 (9) 
 
In order to make the results comparable to previous studies (e.g., Benou & Richie, 2003; Himmelmann et 
al., 2012), the AARs are calculated for the interval τ1 τ2ϵ[-6;6] and CARs up to 36 months after the original event. If 
there is missing data in the calculation month or the subsequently investigated time period (e.g., due to insolvencies 
or acquisitions), the event is left out. 
 
In order to test for normality of the return distribution, the Jarque-Bera test on normality (Jarque & Bera, 
1987) is applied and in order to test whether AARs and ACARs differ statistically significantly from zero the 
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standard t-Test and the Mikkelson and Partch (1986) test are applied. Furthermore, for the determination of time-
varying risk, the Wilcoxon rank-sum test is used as a nonparametric difference test. 
 
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
During the examination period from January 2003 to December 2011, the FTSE/JSE Top 40 comprised 68 
different firms with an average listing period of 5.25 years. Only 25 firms were constituents of the index during the 
entire examination period. 
 
 
 Figure 1: Panel A: Return Distribution of Sample Panel B: Return Distribution of Events 
 
The sample contains 4,369 monthly returns of the respective current constituents. Panel A of Figure 1 
shows the distribution of the sample returns. The mean and the median of the sample returns are 1.59% and 1.37%, 
respectively. Further, the standard deviation of the monthly returns is 8.75% (annualized standard deviation of 
30.32%) with a maximum and minimum return of 51.16% and -46.24%, respectively. Applying the Jarque-Bera test 
for normality, the null hypothesis that the sample comes from a normal distribution has to be rejected at the 0.1% 
significance level.
1
 
 
Panel B of Figure 1 shows the return distribution of the events. The average return for a month representing 
an increase event is 25.78% (median = 24.18%) with a standard deviation of 5.86% (annualized standard deviation 
of 20.30%). The average return for a month representing a decline event is -26.77% (median = -24.51%) with a 
standard deviation of 7.05% (annualized standard deviation of 24.42%). The magnitudes of event returns are always 
above or below the relevant index returns, thereby preventing a bias through the event determination process. 
 
4.2 Analysis of Stock Returns Following Price Increases 
 
The market-model AARs,
2
 surrounding large price increases are shown in Table 2. In the 13-month period 
starting 6 months before the event month, which is denoted as month 0, and ending 6 months after the event month, 
no particular patterns can be observed with regard to AARs. In addition, the t-Test does not show any statistical 
significance, except for the AAR in the fourth month after the event. As expected, the AAR in the event month is 
large and significant. The Mikkelson-Partch test statistic indicates statistical significance for almost all months. The 
test statistic normalizes ARs by the weighted residual variance from the parameter estimation. However, since the 
residual variance is rather small in nearly all models, which may be caused by a bias in the residual variance 
estimation, the Mikkelson-Partch test indicates significance more frequently. Therefore, relying on the t-Test as the 
reference test seems to be a more conservative approach and hence only the results with regards to the t-Test will be 
discussed in more detail in this and the following sections. 
                                                 
1 In addition to the Jarque-Bera test for normality, the Anderson-Darling test and the Shapiro-Wilk test were also applied. Both tests reject the 
assumption of a normal distribution at the 0.1% significance level, confirming the results of the Jarque-Bera test. 
2 Due to the similarity of results, the results of the market-adjusted-model are not provided. However, significant deviations between the two 
models are indicated. 
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Table 3 shows market-model ACARs prior to and following large price increases. All ACARs following 
the event month are positive. Hence, price increases show momentum. All ACARs over time periods that end 36 
months after the initial event are statistically significant. In addition, the windows [3;6] and [3;24] are significant as 
well. ACARs in the time windows prior to the event are not statistically significant. This, in combination with the 
AARs during the pre-event period, indicates that large price increases are not predictable. It should be noted, that 
market-adjusted ACARs are generally smaller in magnitude but still significant. It should also be noted that most of 
the statistically significant ACARs exhibit a smaller sample size, indicating a possible survivor bias. 
 
Table 2: AARs Surrounding Large Price Increases (Market-Model) 
Month Sample Size AAR Median AR t-Test Mikkelson/Partch 
-6 90 -1.45% -1.40% -1.30 -5.42a 
-5 90 0.64% 0.85% 0.52 1.53 
-4 90 1.56% 0.51% 1.20 4.30a 
-3 90 0.58% 0.00% 0.67 1.13 
-2 90 -1.53% -2.21% -1.43 -4.30a 
-1 90 -1.82% -0.79% -1.57 -4.02a 
0 90 19.26% 19.02% 22.34a 73.97a 
1 90 -0.29% 0.44% -0.37 -0.65 
2 90 -0.72% -1.31% -0.71 -0.83 
3 90 1.46% 2.07% 1.55 4.62a 
4 90 1.87% 0.19% 1.79c 5.72a 
5 89 -0.67% -0.90% -0.78 -1.43 
6 89 1.36% 0.29% 1.39 6.10a 
a, b, c denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Summarizing the above findings, stock returns after large price increases exhibit a momentum pattern. The 
following periods exhibit positive ACARs, although they are mostly only statistically significant with regards to the 
event window ending 36 months after the original event. The findings point, at least superficially, towards an 
underreaction to good news by investors in the South African stock market. However, it can also be seen as 
supporting the Efficient Market Hypothesis as many result lack statistical significance. 
 
Table 3: ACARs Surrounding Large Price Increases (Market-Model) 
Time Window Sample Size ACAR Median CAR t-Test Mikkelson/Partch 
[-12;-1] 90 3.14% -2.83% 0.82 3.62a 
[-6;-1] 90 -2.02% -1.30% -0.75 -2.77a 
[1;6] 89 3.09% 4.81% 1.45 5.68a 
[1;12] 88 3.84% 0.52% 1.21 4.97a 
[1;24] 87 7.22% 2.14% 1.49 9.05a 
[1;36] 64 27.42% 25.94% 3.91a 16.67a 
[3;6] 89 4.00% 2.59% 2.47b 7.36a 
[3;12] 88 4.70% 2.10% 1.65 5.61a 
[3;24] 87 8.01% 3.70% 1.80c 9.47a 
[3;36] 64 26.95% 25.62% 4.12a 16.69a 
[6;12] 88 2.03% 1.38% 0.74 3.44a 
[12;24] 87 4.36% 3.64% 1.26 7.75a 
[12;36] 64 24.05% 22.14% 4.26a 16.59a 
[24;36] 64 21.11% 17.24% 4.95a 16.97a 
a, b, c denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
4.3 Analysis of Stock Returns Following Price Declines 
 
Table 4 shows the market-model AARs starting 6 months before the event month, which is denoted as 
month 0, and ending 6 months after the event month. Again most of the AARs are not statistically significant with 
regard to the t-Test. There is also no discernable pattern in regard to the sign and magnitude of the returns. As 
expected, the event month exhibits a large, statistically significant, and negative AAR. There is some evidence for 
price reversals in the fifth post-event month based on the t-Test, which might point to initial overreaction by 
investors. Nevertheless, the findings in general do not necessarily contradict the Efficient Market Hypothesis. 
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The ACARs are shown in Table 5. As in the case of large price increases, the months prior to the decline do 
not exhibit statistically significant ACARs. The ACARs following the event month are positive except for the last 
two time windows ([12;36] and [24;36]). However, only three time windows, [3;6], [3;12], [3;24], show statistical 
significance in regard to the t-Test. It seems that the statistically significant reversal disappears if the third year after 
the event is also considered. 
 
Table 4: AARs Surrounding Large Price Declines (Market-Model) 
Month Sample Size AAR Median AR t-Test Mikkelson/Partch 
-6 55 0.70% 0.63% 0.58 1.87c 
-5 55 -1.16% -1.89% -0.72 -3.33a 
-4 55 1.60% 1.07% 1.10 3.09a 
-3 55 0.58% -2.36% 0.36 0.70 
-2 55 -1.38% -0.87% -0.96 -5.22a 
-1 55 -2.36% -0.81% -1.53 -4.33a 
0 55 -19.45% -19.33% -16.57a -54.02a 
1 55 -1.22% -0.97% -0.52 -3.52a 
2 55 0.01% 0.26% 0.01 -2.35b 
3 55 -0.38% -0.79% -0.19 -3.77a 
4 55 -0.36% -0.90% -0.23 -3.10a 
5 55 4.18% 2.50% 2,80a 9.43a 
6 55 1.36% -0.95% 0.91 1.89c 
a, b, c denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Summing up the findings on returns following large price declines, there are statistically significant 
reversal patterns up to 2 years after the original event. However, these patterns disappear, if the third year after the 
event is also included. The results lend some support to the Overreaction Hypothesis. 
 
Table 5: ACARs Surrounding Large Price Declines (Market-Model) 
Time Window Sample Size ACAR Median CAR t-Test Mikkelson/Partch 
[-12;-1] 55 3.71% 2.22% 0.71 0.90 
[-6;-1] 55 -2.02% -2.89% -0.64 -2.94a 
[1;6] 55 3.59% 1.62% 1.01 -0.58 
[1;12] 55 6.61% 7.51% 1.59 2.26b 
[1;24] 54 9.29% 15.68% 1.52 4.41a 
[1;36] 52 8.30% 1.71% 1.09 2.06b 
[3;6] 55 4.80% 4.61% 1.72c 2.22b 
[3;12] 55 7.82% 5.99% 2.19b 4.33a 
[3;24] 54 10.38% 14.31% 1.86c 5.78a 
[3;36] 52 9.79% 0.18% 1.40 3.18a 
[6;12] 55 4.38% 6.15% 1.43 4.21a 
[12;24] 54 -0.85% -2.61% -0.19 0.97 
[12;36] 52 -2.90% -12.55% -0.45 -1.46 
[24;36] 52 -2.02% -8.38% -0.42 -3.16a 
a, b, c denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
In light of the observed return continuation after large price increases and the return reversal after large 
price declines, the findings seem to support the Uncertain Information Hypothesis. However, the ACARs are of 
larger magnitude after price increases than after price declines. This asymmetry is opposite to the expectations of the 
Uncertain Information Hypothesis and hence contradicts it to a certain degree. 
 
4.4 Robustness Checks 
 
Multiple robustness checks are applied in order to check the validity of the prior results. Since the 
FTSE/JSE Top 40 index only comprises the largest and therefore most liquid South African firms, the results ought 
to be relatively stable against size and illiquidity effects. Nevertheless, as additional robustness checks, different 
trigger values and subsamples are analyzed and time variation in risk is investigated. By using a trigger value of 
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30% instead of 20%, only 15 events remain to be analyzed. The findings largely confirm the previous results.
3
 
ACARs generally increase in magnitude but at the same time their significance is reduced. Furthermore, not all 
observed ACARs have the positive sign anymore, questioning the previously observed continuation pattern. Using a 
trigger value of -30% instead of -20%, only 12 events remain. The results still largely corroborate earlier findings. 
The previously significant windows ([3;6], [3;12], [3;24]) increase in significance and, in addition, the windows 
[1;6], [1;12] also become significant. These ACARs increase in magnitude and are positive. Hence, these price 
reversals after large declines lend further support to overreaction by investors. 
 
Splitting up the sample of large price increases into pre- and post-2008 subsamples (i.e., the period prior to 
the onset of the recent financial crisis on the South African market (January 2003 to December 2007) and the period 
largely including it (January 2008 to December 2011)) does not lead to particularly new insights and hence the 
results are not reported here.
4
 However, splitting the price declines into these two subsamples leads to some 
interesting insights (see Table 6 and Table 7). 
 
Table 6: ACARs Surrounding Large Price Declines Prior to 2008 (Market-Model) 
Time Window Sample Size ACAR Median CAR t-Test Mikkelson/Partch 
[-12;-1] 12 -4.27% -11.89% -0.26 -4.44a 
[-6;-1] 12 -9.80% -13.98% -1.15 -6.15a 
[1;6] 12 4.49% -3.07% 0.60 -0.92 
[1;12] 12 4.62% 5.94% 0.43 -0.17 
[1;24] 12 -0.18% 19.02% -0.01 1.29 
[1;36] 12 19.93% 23.36% 1.19 3.38a 
[3;6] 12 4.81% 2.07% 0.74 -0.46 
[3;12] 12 4.95% 8.12% 0.45 0.24 
[3;24] 12 0.14% 16.81% 0.01 1.63 
[3;36] 12 20.26% 13.31% 1.12 3.71a 
[6;12] 12 -1.01% 8.89% -0.10 -1.09 
[12;24] 12 -10.32% -2.78% -0.62 -0.35 
[12;36] 12 9.79% 18.31% 0.54 2.54b 
[24;36] 12 19.95% -7.42% 1.33 4.19a 
a, b, c denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Table 7: ACARs Surrounding Large Price Declines 2008 and Later (Market-Model) 
Time Window Sample Size ACAR Median CAR t-Test Mikkelson/Partch 
[-12;-1] 43 5.94% 2.39% 1.18 3.36a 
[-6;-1] 43 0.15% -2.15% 0.05 -0.08 
[1;6] 43 3.33% 2.86% 0.82 -0.17 
[1;12] 43 7.17% 7.67% 1.60 2.64a 
[1;24] 42 12.00% 12.70% 1.99c 4.31a 
[1;36] 40 4.81% -5.43% 0.56 0.50 
[3;6] 43 4.79% 4.75% 1.54 2.76a 
[3;12] 43 8.62% 5.33% 2.51b 4.77a 
[3;24] 42 13.31% 14.31% 2.83a 5.68a 
[3;36] 40 6.65% -2.08% 0.90 1.59 
[6;12] 43 5.89% 4.34% 2.11b 5.33a 
[12;24] 42 1.86% -2.61% 0.56 1.29 
[12;36] 40 -6.71% -14.99% -1.04 -3.05a 
[24;36] 40 -8.61% -8.38% -2.14b -5.90a 
a, b, c denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
As Table 6 shows, large price declines do not lead to any statistically significant returns with regards to the 
t-Test during the pre-2008 period. This might be due to the rather small sample size, but it is still a noteworthy 
result. The results for the time period between 2008 and 2011 are presented in Table 7. The previously significant 
reversals for the windows [3;12] and [3;24] increase in significance and the windows [1;24] and [6;12] become 
                                                 
3 For brevity only the main results are discussed here. Tables with the exact results are available from the authors upon request. 
4 The tables with the results of the price increases for the period prior to 2008 and for 2008 and later are available from the authors upon request. 
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significant. Since these price reversals are positive in magnitude, these results seem to further support the 
Overreaction Hypothesis. In addition, the overall results for large price declines seem to be largely driven by the 
2008-2011 time period. This result is not surprising, since this time period includes approximately 78% of all 
investigated price declines. 
 
The abnormal returns observed so far may be induced by a variation of risk and could therefore potentially 
change over time. In order to check for time-varying risk, we estimate the parameters of the market-model during 
the one year period prior to the event and additionally estimate the parameters during a one year period, beginning 
two years after the initial event. Table 8 shows the medians of both betas; the one estimated during the period prior 
to the event β1, and during the period after the event β2. 
 
The difference in betas of decline events is significant. This difference is even more pronounced for events 
that occurred in 2008 and subsequent years. This effect may explain the reversal patterns found after large price 
declines and can be construed as evidence for the Uncertain Information Hypothesis, which states that the arrival of 
new information leads to uncertainty and hence an increase in risk. In addition, the risk in the third year (not 
reported) after the event, is not significantly different from β1. This, in combination with the price reversals after 
large price declines and price continuation after large price increases, can be seen as a confirmation of the Uncertain 
Information Hypothesis, as once the event induced uncertainty is resolved, the risk reverts to its previous level. 
Furthermore, the betas for both large price increases and large price declines increase significantly in the post-2008 
time period. This suggests that the recent financial crisis raised the systematic market risk in the South African 
equity market. 
 
Table 8: Differences in Beta between a Pre- and a Post-Event Period 
Sample Sample Size β1 β2 ∆β 
All Events     
Increases 87 0.89 0.97 0.08 
Declines 55 0.82 1.02 0.20c 
Pre-2008 Events     
Increases 46 0.90 0.88 -0.01 
Declines 12 0.91 0.78 -0.14 
Post-2008 Events     
Increases 41 0.85 1.11 0.26c 
Declines 43 0.81 1.13 0.32b 
a, b, c denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
This study analyses cumulative abnormal returns following large price increases and declines for stocks 
included in the South African FTSE/JSE Top 40 index in the period from January 2003 to December 2011. Events 
are identified by using a trigger value of ±20%. Various robustness checks are implemented in order to check the 
overall results. 
 
The analysis finds that large price increases are followed by positive ACARs. These ACARs are 
statistically significant with regard to the period ending 36 months after the initial event and beginning in the first, 
third, 12
th
, or 24
th
 month following the initial event. In addition, the ACARs are always positive. Large price 
declines are also followed by positive but smaller ACARs. These ACARs are statistically significant in time 
windows beginning in the third month after the initial event and ending up to 24 months later. Further robustness 
checks reveal that the magnitude of these positive returns even increases when using a trigger value of -30%. In 
addition, an analysis of the betas shows that the systematic risk in the post-2008 years has increased for the 
investigated stocks in the South African market, but returns to normal levels two years after the original event. 
These findings weakly support the Uncertain Information Hypothesis. However, the almost complete lack of 
significance of the ACARs after price increases of more than 30% somewhat weaken this conclusion. 
 
The patterns observed for the South African stock market in this paper stand in contrast to some of the 
more recent research findings for developed markets (e.g., Himmelmann et al., 2012). In particular the more 
pronounced overreaction observed after the recent financial crisis make it apparent that the South African stock 
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market is not fully efficient yet. Nevertheless, the anomalies observed in this paper can also be observed for well-
developed and well-established markets, such as the US (e.g., Benou & Richie, 2003). However, it remains doubtful 
whether the observed anomalies can really be exploited by arbitrageurs, as liquidity concerns might play a major 
role, since the South African market still shows significantly lower levels of liquidity than more developed 
economies. 
 
Future research in this area should investigate whether the results obtained in the present study also hold for 
other emerging economies, such as Brazil and China. Especially due to their increased importance to the global 
economy additional research on the market efficiency of these economies is certainly justified. In addition, it would 
be interesting to see whether any particular factors can explain the observed inefficiencies. 
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